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I.

INTRODUCTION

It is well established that personal injury and property loss caused by a
defective product can be recovered from a remote manufacturer without
establishing privity.1 Conversely, a hot topic in warranty law today is whether
economic loss can be recovered from a remote manufacturer in the chain of

* Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I would like to thank Mr. Jerome Mohsen for
his excellent research, insights, and valuable contributions in the making of this Article.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
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distribution.2 The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) mandates that every
manufacturer gives the implied warranty of merchantability for every sale of
its product, unless the manufacturer disclaims it.3 The implied warranty of
merchantability means that every product must be fit for its ordinary use.4 The
implied warranty is the minimum standard set for each product sold by a
manufacturer.5 Its importance cannot be overstated. Currently, there is a
significant split of authority among the states on whether a buyer must be in
privity with the manufacturer of the product before that buyer can sue the
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.6
This Article identifies each state’s position on whether that state requires
privity before an aggrieved buyer can sue the remote manufacturer for breach
of the implied warranty of merchantability. In addition, this Article identifies
the primary arguments put forth on both sides of the issue. Currently,
Wisconsin is in the distinct minority of states that do not permit the buyer to
sue the remote manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability unless the buyer can establish privity. Finally, the Article
concludes with the Author’s analysis of the conflicting arguments and a
recommendation for the future.
II. THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY—STATUTORY
WARRANTY
The implied warranty of merchantability is given by every seller who is a
merchant with respect to the goods it sells.7 A manufacturer obviously qualifies
as a merchant, and therefore gives the implied warranty of merchantability
every time it sells a good. The implied warranty of merchantability is
understood to mean that the good being sold is fit for the ordinary purpose for
which such good is normally used.8 Stated differently, the implied warranty of
merchantability requires that a manufacturer’s good will actually fulfill its
understood purpose. In other words, shoe polish should actually polish your
shoes, and if it doesn’t, the implied warranty of merchantability has been
breached. The importance of the implied warranty of merchantability is

2.
(2010).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 10:20
Id. § 5:1.
Id. § 5:3.
See id. § 5:1.
Id. § 10:20.
WIS. STAT. § 402.314(1) (2015–2016).
Id. § 402.314(2)(c).
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underscored by the fact that it is required by law in every merchant transaction.9
It is a mandated, statutory warranty as opposed to an express warranty which
the seller has the option to offer.10
A. Duration of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability
There is no fixed duration for the implied warranty of merchantability.11
The merchantability warranty does not extend to future performance of a good
like an express warranty.12 Rather, the warranty is measured as of the time of
delivery.13 An action, therefore, brought for breach of implied warranty of
merchantability must be brought before the UCC statute of limitations expires14
or at an earlier agreed expiration date as provided in the parties’ contract.15 If
the parties do agree to a shorter statute of limitation, the minimum period cannot
be less than one year.16
B. Disclaiming the Implied Warranty of Merchantability and Limitations of
Remedy
Risk allocation is dealt with in entirely different ways depending upon
whether an action is denominated as one in tort or contract. Tort law places the
risk of loss onto the manufacturer to protect the public from personal injury and
property damage.17 On the other hand, contract law, through the UCC, provides
the structure for the parties to allocate any risk of economic loss18 between or
amongst themselves through their contract.19 Interestingly, in Wisconsin, the
tort and contract claims are mutually exclusive and cannot be brought in the
same lawsuit.20 Therefore, it’s critical for an attorney to be able to properly
classify the type of loss suffered by the client in order to properly plead a case.
9. CLARK & SMITH, supra note 2, § 5:1.
10. Id. § 4:1.
11. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:13-6529, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172348, at *87 (S.D. W.
Va. Nov. 24, 2015) (quoting Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 285, 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. WIS. STAT. § 402.725(1) (2015–2016).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Grams v. Milk Prods., Inc., 2005 WI 112, ¶ 18, 283 Wis. 2d 511, 699 N.W.2d 167 (quoting
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., 2004 WI 139, ¶ 39, 276 Wis. 2d 361, 688 N.W.2d 462).
18. Ralph C. Anzivino, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Distinguishing Economic Loss from NonEconomic Loss, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2008).
19. Grams, 2005 WI 112, ¶ 17 (citing Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids Inc., 216 Wis. 2d
395, 407, 573 N.W.2d 842, 847–48 (1998)).
20. Austin v. Ford Motor Co., 86 Wis. 2d 628, 644, 273 N.W.2d 233, 240 (1979).

ANZIVINO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

508

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

2/24/18 1:06 PM

[101:505

One way that manufacturers allocate the risk of loss in a sales transaction
is through the use of disclaimers. Manufacturers are permitted to expressly
modify or completely exclude the implied warranty of merchantability.21 To
expressly exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability the
manufacturer’s disclaimer must mention the word “merchantability” and, if the
disclaimer is in writing, it must be conspicuous.22 The implied warranty of
merchantability can also be excluded by expressions such as “as is” or by the
buyer’s inspection of the goods prior to their purchase.23 Finally, the implied
warranty of merchantability can be modified or excluded by course of dealing,
course of performance, or trade practice.24
Another way for manufacturers to control risk of loss is by limiting the
buyer’s remedies in the event of a loss. The manufacturer may limit the buyer’s
remedy to an exclusive one25 (e.g., repair or replacement) provided that remedy
does not fail for its essential purpose.26 Finally, the manufacturer may also
exclude consequential damages, unless the exclusion is deemed
unconscionable.27
All of the foregoing methods are available to a manufacturer to control its
exposure to economic loss. It’s clear, however, that if a disclaimer or limitation
of remedy is not disclosed to the buyer at the time that the buyer contracts to
buy the product, the disclaimer or limitation of remedy is not effective.28 As a
general rule, it is the burden of the party seeking to invoke a warranty exclusion
or limitation of remedy to plead and prove its effect.29 Also, warranty
exclusions and limitation of remedy clauses are strictly construed against the
author.30
The following case is instructive on the correct way for a manufacturer to
effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability and also limit the
buyer’s remedy. In R & L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., the buyer purchased

21. WIS. STAT. § 402.316(2).
22. Id.
23. Id. §§ 402.316(3)(a)–(b).
24. Id. § 402.316(3)(d).
25. Id. §§ 402.719(1)(a)–(b).
26. Id. § 402.719(2).
27. Id. § 402.719(3).
28. See Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); see
also Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 850, 852–53 (Okla. 1979).
29. DeCoria v. Red’s Trailer Mart, Inc., 491 P.2d 241, 244 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
30. Admiral Oasis Hotel Corp. v. Home Gas Indus., Inc., 216 N.E.2d 282, 286 (Ill. App. Ct.
1965) (quoting Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 77–78 (N.J. 1960)).
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a grain storage bin from the manufacturer’s dealer.31 The terms of sale
contained a manufacturer’s express warranty that the product was free from
defects in material and workmanship.32 Included within the language of the
express warranty, was a disclaimer of the implied warranty of
merchantability.33 Also in the express warranty, the manufacturer limited its
liability to repair and replacement for a period of twelve months after the date
of delivery.34 Upon the product’s failure to perform as expected, the buyer sued
the manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.35 The
buyer sought to nullify the effect of the implied warranty disclaimer and the
limitation of remedy on the basis that neither the buyer nor the dealer were ever
actually aware of the warranty exclusion or limitation of remedy.36 The court
concluded, however, that actual knowledge was not required but simply that
the disclaimer and limitation of remedy be “reasonably noticeable.”37 In fact,
the court found that the disclaimer and limitation of remedy were conspicuous
as required by the UCC.38
The simple solution to disclosing the implied warranty of merchantability
disclaimer or limitation of remedy is to follow the lead of the R & L Grain Co.
case and place the merchantability disclaimer or limitation of remedy in with
the express warranty,39 and require that the merchantability disclaimer or
limitation of remedy be included in the selling dealer’s forms or otherwise
included as part of the sales transaction.40 The essential legal requirement that
must be satisfied is that the disclaimer or limitation of remedy be conspicuous
in the sales contract.
III. HORIZONTAL PRIVITY OR VERTICAL PRIVITY
Privity is defined as “[t]he connection or relationship between two parties,
each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter.”41 Privity
“implies a connection, mutuality of will, and interaction of parties.”42 There
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

531 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
Hunter v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 303 (8th Cir. 1986).
Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Wrenshall State Bank v. Shutt, 202 Wis. 281, 232 N.W. 530, 530 (1930).
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are two types of privity.43 One is known as horizontal privity and the other is
vertical privity.44 The distinction between horizontal and vertical privity is
significant. Horizontal privity is defined as “[t]he legal relationship between a
party and a nonparty who is related to the party (such as a buyer and a member
of the buyer’s family).”45 Horizontal privity issues address the question of
“whether persons other than the buyer of defective goods can recover from the
buyer’s immediate seller on a warranty theory.”46 Vertical privity is defined as
“[t]he legal relationship between parties in a product’s chain of distribution
(such as a manufacturer[, wholesaler, retailer, buyer] and a seller).”47 Vertical
privity issues ask “whether parties in the distributive chain prior to the
immediate seller can be held liable to the ultimate purchaser for loss caused by
the defective product.”48 Official comment 3 to section 2-318 (Third Party
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied) makes clear that the intent of
the section was to deal with horizontal privity and not vertical privity.49 In fact,
the official comment makes clear that the section was “not intended to enlarge
or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, given to
[the] buyer who resells, extend to [any] other persons in the distributive
chain.”50 Therefore, the UCC has left vertical privity issues to be decided by
each state independently.
A. The Erosion of the Vertical Privity Requirement
The requirement that one be in privity with the other party in the distributive
chain before one is able to sue that party has been under attack for many years.51
The courts have developed a number of approaches to avoid the requirement of
vertical privity when a buyer of a product wishes to assert a claim against a
remote manufacturer in the distributive chain. There are at least four fairly
identifiable approaches.

43. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 287 (Alaska 1976).
44. See id.
45. Horizontal Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
46. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 287.
47. Vertical Privity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
48. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 287.
49. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
50. Id.
51. William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1099, 1148 (1960) (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)).

ANZIVINO - MULR VOL. 101, NO. 2 (FINAL 2.7.18).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY

2/24/18 1:06 PM

511

1. Agency/Conduit Concepts
Some courts have used the idea that those selling the manufacturer’s
product are simply agents or conduits of the manufacturer. 52 For example, in
Sanco, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., the buyer purchased Ford trucks from the Ford
dealer and not directly from Ford.53 Nevertheless, the buyer sued Ford for
defects in the trucks, and Ford raised the vertical privity defense.54 The court
rejected the vertical privity defense because the contractual arrangement
between the manufacturer and the dealer created an agency relationship,
particularly where it is shown that the manufacturer significantly participated
in the sale through personal contact with the buyer and by means of
advertising.55
2. Third-Party Beneficiary
“The absence of privity will not bar an action upon an implied warranty [of
merchantability] . . . when the circumstances attendant the sales transaction
make the remote purchaser a third-party beneficiary of the contract.”56 In R &
L Grain Co. v. Chicago E. Corp., R & L Grain Co. purchased a grain storage
bin from a dealer of the defendant manufacturer.57 When the bin proved to be
unsatisfactory for Wisconsin winters, the plaintiff sued alleging various
theories, including breach of implied warranty of merchantability.58 The
manufacturer responded by filing a motion to dismiss the implied warranty
claim on the basis that there was no privity between the parties.59 The court
noted that although privity is generally a necessary element to maintain a claim
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, the absence of privity is
not a bar when the contract circumstances indicate that the remote purchaser
was a third-party beneficiary of the primary contract.60 Some courts require
that in order for a buyer to qualify as a third-party beneficiary, the manufacturer

52. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984); see also Morrow v. Caloric
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. 1963).
53. 579 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff’d, 771 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1985).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. R & L Grain Co. v. Chi. E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 208 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (citing Frank’s
Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
57. Id. at 203.
58. Id. at 204.
59. Id. at 204, 207–08.
60. Id. at 208; see also Naef v. Masonite Corp., 923 F. Supp. 1504, 1508 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(quoting Chandler v. Hunter, 340 So. 2d 818, 822 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).
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must know the identity, requirements, and purpose of the dealer’s customer.61
“[M]erely alleging that the remote [manufacturer] knows that a dealer will
resell the . . . product” is not sufficient to support the third-party beneficiary
claim.62
3. Strict Liability
A remote manufacturer “who sells or distributes a defective product is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”63 This
principle is commonly known as strict liability.64 “Strict liability . . . for
defectively manufactured products merges the concept of implied warranty, in
which negligence is not required, with the tort concept of negligence, in which
contractual privity is not required.”65 No privity is required in a strict liability
claim against a manufacturer.66
4. Express Warranty
The fact that a product is sold with an express warranty from the
manufacturer creates privity between the remote manufacturer and the ultimate
buyer, notwithstanding that there is no contract between the two parties.67 In
Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., the plaintiff purchased the manufacturer’s
product from the manufacturer’s dealer.68 Prior to the purchase, the
manufacturer provided express warranties to the remote purchaser regarding
the product’s capabilities.69 Upon the product’s failure to live up to its
warranted capabilities, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of the
manufacturer’s express warranties.70 At the trial level, the plaintiff’s action
against the manufacturer was dismissed because there was no privity between
the plaintiff-buyer and the remote manufacturer.71 On appeal, however, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that there was privity between the remote
manufacturer and the purchaser because of the manufacturer’s actions and
61. Chi. Heights Venture v. Dynamit Nobel of Am., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 214, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(citing Frank’s Maint. & Eng’g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 408 N.E.2d 403, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)).
62. Id. (citing Slate Printing Co. v. Metro Envelope Co., 532 F. Supp. 431, 433 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1998).
64. See id. § 1 cmt. a.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 527, 319 N.W.2d 855, 863 (1982).
68. Id. at 513–14.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 515.
71. Id. at 516.
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express representations made during the sales process.72 In essence, the court
recognized that the manufacturer’s statements had become part of the basis of
the bargain and thereby an express warranty.73 The grant of the express
warranty creates a “contractual relationship” and, thereby legal privity, despite
the fact that there is no contract between the buyer and the remote
manufacturer.74
B. Vertical Privity in the United States
There is a significant split of authority among the states on whether a
remote buyer must be in privity with a manufacturer before the buyer is
permitted to sue for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The
majority of states do not require vertical privity and permit the remote buyer to
sue the manufacturer directly for breach of the implied warranty of

72. Id. at 518–19.
73. Id. at 516, 527.
74. McNeal v. Blue Bird Corp., No. 308763, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1082, at *12 (June 12,
2014) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
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merchantability.75 A minority of states, however, do insist on privity between
the remote manufacturer and the aggrieved buyer.76

75. Thirty-one states do not require privity: (1) Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d
279, 289 (Alaska 1976); (2) Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 437 S.W.2d 459,
462 (Ark. 1969); (3) Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Winkler, 640 P.2d 216, 221 (Colo. 1982); (4) Martin
v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 583 (Del. 1976); (5) Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc.,
659 P.2d 734, 743 (Haw. 1983) (applying the principle in a personal injury claim but seen as extending
to economic loss in a federal case); (6) Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 958–
59 (Ind. 2005); (7) Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377,
381 (La. 1972) (citing Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 100 So. 2d 493, 494 (La. 1957); Le Blanc v. La.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. 1952)); (8) Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466
A.2d 478, 482 (Me. 1983) (stating rule generally, though in a personal injury case); (9) Jacobs v.
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 1995); (10) Spence v. Three Rivers
Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1958); (11) Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co.
v. Nishika Ltd., 565 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Minn. 1997); (12) Hargett v. Midas Int’l Corp., 508 So. 2d 663,
665 (Miss. 1987); (13) Groppel Co. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 616 S.W.2d 49, 58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
(14) Whitaker v. Farmhand, Inc., 567 P.2d 916, 919–20 (Mont. 1977); (15) Peterson v. N. Am. Plant
Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625, 632 (Neb. 1984); (16) Hiles Co. v. Johnston Pump Co. of Pasadena, Cal.,
560 P.2d 154, 157 (Nev. 1977); (17) Dalton v. Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629 A.2d 794, 797 (N.H.
1993); (18) Spring Motors Distribs., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985); (19)
Perfetti v. McGhan Med., 1983-NMCA-032, ¶ 59, 99 N.M. 645, 662 P.2d 646, 655 (stating rule
generally, though in a personal injury case); (20) Lang v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 N.W.2d 805, 810
(N.D. 1965); (21) Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 851–52
(Okla. 1979); (22) Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 853–54 (Pa. 1968), overruled on other grounds
by AM/PM Franchise Ass’n v. Atl. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990); (23) Kelly v. Ford Motor
Co., 290 A.2d 607, 610 (R.I. 1972); (24) Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 243 S.E.2d 831, 832 (S.C.
1978); (25) Cundy v. Int’l Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984); (26) Commercial
Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. v. McCampbell, 580 S.W.2d 765, 772 (Tenn. 1979); (27) Nobility Homes
of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977); (28) Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v.
Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 17–18 (Utah 1990); (29) Gasque v. Mooers Motor Car Co., 313
S.E.2d 384, 390 (Va. 1984); (30) Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d 82, 84 (W. Va. 1975) (stating
rule generally in a personal injury case, overruling all previous cases requiring privity); (31) W. Equip.
Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 810 (Wyo. 1980).
76. Nineteen states require privity for a remote buyer to sue a manufacturer for economic loss.
(1) State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. J.B. Plastics, Inc., 505 So. 2d 1223, 1227 (Ala. 1987); (2) Flory v.
Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 388 (Ariz. 1981); (3) Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 268 P.2d
1041, 1048–49 (Cal. 1954); (4) Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 276 A.2d 807, 812 (Conn. Cir.
Ct. 1970); (5) Mesa v. BMW of N. Am., L.L.C., 904 So. 2d 450, 458 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); (6)
Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 208 S.E.2d 321, 323 (Ga. Ct. App. 1974); (7) Salmon Rivers
Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 312 (Idaho 1975); (8) Mellander v.
Kileen, 407 N.E.2d 1137, 1138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); (9) Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d
103, 108 (Iowa 1995); (10) Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898–99
(Kan. 1984); (11) Compex Int’l Co. v. Taylor, 209 S.W.3d 462, 465 (Ky. 2006), as modified on denial
of reh’g (Jan. 25, 2007); (12) see Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 637–38 (Md.
1995) (requiring privity in the vertical chain and providing it by statute, see MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAW § 2-314(1)(a) (West 2017) (“In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, ‘seller’ includes the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler, or other middleman or the retailer . . . .”)); (13) Martin
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C. Vertical Privity in Wisconsin
The law of Wisconsin has historically required privity of contract in an
action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.77 The rule came
from English common law.78 The rationale for creation of the rule was to
protect nascent manufacturers from the onslaught of potentially disastrous
claims.79 Fifty years ago, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated
that the tender days of the Industrial Revolution had long past and the Court
should be more concerned about the injured and hapless buyer of manufactured
products.80 The Court reasoned that the concepts of laissez-faire and caveat
emptor should “give[] way to more humane considerations.”81 As a result, the
Court adopted the doctrine of strict liability against a remote manufacturer for
damage caused to an individual’s person or their property.82 Privity is no longer
required in such an action.83 The reasons offered for no longer requiring privity
are that the manufacturer is in the best position to distribute the costs created
by the defective product onto all buyers via increased prices; the manufacturer
may protect itself by purchasing insurance or a form of self-insurance; the
manufacturer in the first instance creates the risk by placing the defective
product on the market; and the manufacturer has the greatest ability to avoid
the risk created by its product through its quality control measures.84
Albeit privity is no longer required for personal injury or property damage,
Wisconsin is in the minority of states that requires privity to assert a claim
v. Julius Dierck Equip. Co., 374 N.E.2d 97, 100 (N.Y. 1978); (14) Gregory v. Atrium Door & Window
Co., 415 S.E.2d 574, 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); (15) Curl v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 114 Ohio St.
3d 266, 2007-Ohio-3609, 871 N.E.2d 1141, at ¶ 26; (16) see State ex rel. W. Seed Prod. Corp. v.
Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968); (17) Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 66 P.3d
625, 628 (Wash. 2003); (18) City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., Inc., 72 Wis. 2d
38, 41, 240 N.W.2d 124, 125 (1976), overruled on other grounds by Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v.
Cedarapids, Inc., 216 Wis. 2d 395, 573 N.W.2d 842 (1998); (19) Mainline Tractor & Equip. Co.
v. Nutrite Corp., 937 F. Supp. 1095, 1107 (D. Vt. 1996), aff’d, 79 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting
Vermont Plastics, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 444, 453 n.11 (D. Vt. 1993) (requiring privity
according to a federal court’s interpretation of the Vermont Supreme Court’s dictum in Gochey v.
Bombardier, Inc., 572 A.2d 921 (1990)).
77. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (1962); KennedyIngalls Corp. v. Meissner, 5 Wis. 2d 100, 109, 92 N.W.2d 247, 252 (1958); Prinsen v. Russos, 194
Wis. 142, 146, 215 N.W. 905, 906 (1927).
78. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 459.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 450–51.
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against a remote manufacturer for economic loss caused by breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability.85 For many years, however, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has been contemplating whether to change its
position.86 The primary reason that caused courts to originally insist on privity
as a prerequisite to an action for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability no longer exists.87 The Uniform Sales Act was the controlling
law in Wisconsin at the time of the adoption of the rule, and the Sales Act
provided that implied warranties extended only between immediate parties to
the sale.88 Today, however, the Uniform Sales Act has been replaced by the
Uniform Commercial Code, which is decidedly neutral on whether vertical
privity is required between the manufacturer and remote buyer regarding the
implied warranty of merchantability.89 Therefore, the opportunity currently
presents itself for Wisconsin to join the majority of states which have been
persuaded to no longer require privity to maintain an action for breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability against a remote manufacturer.
D. Arguments in Favor of Retaining the Vertical Privity Requirement
The reasons why a minority of states continue to require vertical privity
before the buyer can sue the remote manufacturer for breach of the implied
warranty of merchantability can be fairly catalogued.
The decision to bar vertical privity should be made by the legislature, not
the courts. Lifting the vertical privity requirement is a matter of public policy,
and policy decisions should be made by the legislature.90 In light of the fact
that the legislature has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, courts should
85. Id. at 463.
86. Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 16 Wis. 2d 421, 435, 114 N.W.2d 823, 831 (citing Smith v.
Atco Co., 6 Wis. 2d 371, 383, 94 N.W.2d 697, 704 (1959)) (“When this court declared by footnote in
Smith v. Atco Co., that Wisconsin requires privity in breach-of-implied-warranty cases, it was merely
stating the then present status of our law. This does not mean that this court will adhere to this rule
forever, regardless of the persuasiveness of the arguments made, or authorities cited, in favor of
changing it. However, we do not deem the instant case a proper one in which to give consideration to
this question.” (internal citation omitted)).
87. Dippel, 37 Wis. 2d at 454 (“Dean Prosser’s reference to the Uniform Sales Act elucidates
the most distressing problem with adopting the ‘implied warranty’ fiction in the present case. The
Uniform Sales Act as enacted by Wisconsin is the controlling law. Sec. 15 of the Act [WIS. STAT.
§ 121.15 (1961)], specifically provides that there are no implied warranties of quality other than those
set forth in the Act. These are the implied warranties between the ‘buyer’ and the ‘seller.’ By sec. 76
of the Act [WIS. STAT. § 121.76 (1961)], the term ‘buyer’ and ‘seller’ includes only the immediate
parties to the sale.” (footnote omitted)).
88. Id. at 453; see also Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 147, 215 N.W. 905, 907 (1927).
89. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
90. Ciociola v. Del. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 257 (Del. 1961).
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not lightly change the legislative scheme.91 Finally, it would be more
appropriate for vertical privity’s demise to be effectuated by legislative action
because of its long existence as a part of the state’s jurisprudence.92
Lifting the vertical privity requirement would conflict with the scheme of
the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC permits the seller of a product to
disclaim warranties,93 limit remedies,94 and require various notices that must be
given by a complaining buyer to the seller.95 A manufacturer of a product may
have great difficulty disclaiming warranties or limiting remedies when the
manufacturer has no contractual relationship with the ultimate buyer.96
Similarly, in the absence of a contractual relationship, is it realistic to expect
that a buyer would notify a remote manufacturer of a defect in its product as
required by the UCC?97 A buyer’s failure to provide the requisite notice of
defect to the manufacturer is an absolute bar to the buyer’s claim of breach of
implied warranty of merchantability.98
A breach of the implied warranty of merchantability is a claim based on
contract law, and therefore, the claim should be based on an actual contract.
Economic loss damages stemming from an inferior product are better left to a
claim between the buyer and the seller, since they negotiated the terms of the
contract between them.99 Since a contract claim normally only arises from an
agreement between the two parties, vertical privity should be required for a
claim based on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.100 All
warranty claims are an element of contract law, and, therefore, privity should
be required.101
Retaining the vertical privity requirement encourages a buyer to pick his
seller with care. A buyer who carefully selects his seller will have adequate

91. Tomka v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Iowa 1995).
92. Harnischfeger Corp. v. Harris, 190 So. 2d 286, 290 (Ala. 1966).
93. WIS. STAT. § 402.316 (2015–2016).
94. Id. § 402.719.
95. Id. § 402.607(3)(a).
96. Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898 (Kan. 1984); Tomka v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 528 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Iowa 1995).
97. Prof’l Lens Plan, Inc., 675 P.2d at 898.
98. WIS. STAT. § 402.607(3)(a).
99. Steckmar Nat’l Realty & Inv. Corp. v. J I Case Co., 415 N.Y.S.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979).
100. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 544 P.2d 306, 312 (Idaho
1975).
101. Wyatt v. N.C. Equip. Co., 117 S.E.2d 21, 24 (N.C. 1960).
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remedies at law should a warranty be breached.102 Allowing a buyer whose
seller proves to be irresponsible to sue the manufacturer ignores “the
consensual elements of commerce.”103
Finally, none of the three alternatives available for adoption by the states
under section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (Third Party
Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied) eliminates the requirement of
vertical privity.104 Nothing in Georgia’s version of the UCC section 2-318,
“which extends the sellers’ warranties to family members and guests in the
buyer’s home . . . eliminates the requirement that the buyer and the [seller] be
in privity.”105 Similarly, Maryland’s version of section 2-318 lifts the
requirement of privity only when personal injury is involved; thus, the
requirement is still in place for economic loss actions.106
E. Arguments in Favor of Eliminating the Vertical Privity Requirement
The reasons why a majority of states do not require vertical privity between
the remote manufacturer and the buyer in order to validly assert an action based
on breach of the implied warranty of merchantability can also be catalogued.
The vertical privity requirement has so many exceptions that its application
creates unfair results. Some of the major exceptions to the vertical privity
requirement created by the courts are products liability, express warranties,
third-party beneficiaries, and the use of agency/conduit concepts.107 In all of
the foregoing circumstances, the courts have found persuasive reasons to
circumvent the privity requirement in contract actions.108 In fact, the privity
requirement has been so weakened by the various exceptions that it is producing
unfair results.109 The general rule that privity is required with its “quilt of
exceptions” creates legal confusion for courts and for plaintiffs who don’t know
what cause of action is available to them.110

102. Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 389 (Ariz. 1981) (quoting State ex rel. W.
Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968)).
103. Campbell, 442 P.2d at 217.
104. See U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N. 1999).
105. Thomaston v. Fort Wayne Pools, Inc., 352 S.E.2d 794, 796 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
106. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624, 638 (Md. 1995).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 52–74.
108. See id.
109. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 873, 881 (Mich.
1958) (quoting Carter v. Yardley & Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946)).
110. Kassab v. Cent. Soya, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (Pa. 1968), overruled on other grounds by
AM/PM Franchise Ass’n v. Atl. Richfield Co., 584 A.2d 915 (Pa. 1990).
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The requirement of vertical privity leads to numerous, expensive, and
wasteful lawsuits in which each buyer has to sue only the party to which it has
privity. Privity requirements lead to expensive and wasteful procedures
whereby the buyer sues the retailer, who sues the distributor, who then sues the
manufacturer.111 The requirement of vertical privity “perpetuat[es] a needless
chain of actions whereby each buyer must seek redress for breach of warranty
from his own immediate seller until the actual manufacturer is eventually” held
responsible.112 Eliminating the vertical privity requirement promotes judicial
efficiency.113
In many circumstances, the requirement of vertical privity leaves the
aggrieved buyer without a remedy. The rule requiring vertical privity was
created at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in order to protect
struggling and unstable manufacturers.114 Today, the concern has shifted from
protecting the manufacturers to protecting the ultimate buyer.115 Various events
can intervene to stifle a buyer’s claim against the remote manufacturer. For
example, the remote manufacturer can be insulated by the insolvency of the
dealer, lack of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, disclaimers by the dealer in
the sales contract with the buyer, or statute of limitation issues.116 It has also
been argued that retaining the vertical privity requirement could encourage
manufacturers to use thinly capitalized corporations to sell commercially
inferior products, and again leave the buyer without an effective remedy.117
The legislature’s adoption of the UCC section 2-318 abrogated the vertical
privity requirement. Many courts have concluded that its state’s adoption of
section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code eliminated the requirement of
vertical privity in commercial transactions.118 They reason that the plain
111. Bernick v. Jurden, 293 S.E.2d 405, 414 (N.C. 1982) (quoting Kinlaw v. Long Mfg. N.C.,
Inc., 259 S.E.2d 552, 557 (N.C. 1979)).
112. Kassab, 246 A.2d at 856.
113. Old Albany Estates, Ltd. v. Highland Carpet Mills, Inc., 604 P.2d 849, 851–52 (Okla.
1979).
114. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967).
115. Id.
116. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977) (quoting Prosser,
supra note 51, at 1124).
117. Id. at 81–82.
118. Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 (Mass. 1995); Dalton v.
Stanley Solar & Stove, Inc., 629 A.2d 794, 797 (N.H. 1993); Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v.
Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 17–18 (Utah 1990); Hargett v. Midas Int’l Corp., 508 So. 2d 663,
665 (Miss. 1987); Cundy v. Int’l Trencher Serv., Inc., 358 N.W.2d 233, 240 (S.D. 1984); Gasque v.
Mooers Motor Car Co., 313 S.E.2d 384, 390 (Va. 1984); Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 466 A.2d
478, 482 (Me. 1983); W. Equip. Co. v. Sheridan Iron Works, Inc., 605 P.2d 806, 809 (Wyo. 1980).
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language of the section lifts the privity requirement “as to any natural person
who may be expected to use, consume or be affected by the product,” which
those courts believe includes the ultimate buyer of the manufactured product.119
Since section 2-318 extends liability to third-party beneficiaries, those courts
reason that this extension includes the ultimate buyer regardless of privity.120
The same policy reason that caused courts to ignore the vertical privity
requirement for express warranties applies equally to the implied warranty of
merchantability. In Wisconsin,121 as in most other states,122 when a
manufacturer provides an express warranty to a remote buyer, that express
warranty creates a “contractual relationship” between the parties.123 The reason
for creating that “contractual relationship,” and ignoring the requirement of
vertical privity, is that it would be unjust for a manufacturer to create a demand
for its product by making representations, but yet not be ultimately responsible
when the product fails to live up to its representations.124 There seems little
question that in the era of mass marketing the remote buyer is cultivated by the
manufacturer.125 The implied warranty of merchantability, which requires that
a product be fit for its ordinary purpose,126 is the most basic warranty provided
by the UCC.127 In fact, its importance is recognized by the fact that the UCC
implies the implied warranty of merchantability into every transaction when a
merchant sells its product.128 It is unjust to permit a manufacturer to create a
demand for its product by representing that it is selling a merchantable product,
but then, because there is no privity of contract between the buyer and the
remote manufacturer, the buyer is denied the right to recover damages from the
manufacturer when the product proves itself un-merchantable.129 Certainly, if

119. Gasque v. Eagle Mach. Co., 243 S.E.2d 831, 832 (S.C. 1978); see also W. Equip. Co., 605
P.2d at 809–10.
120. Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 743 (Haw. 1983).
121. Paulson v. Olson Implement Co., 107 Wis. 2d 510, 518–19, 319 N.W.2d 855, 859 (1982).
122. See A. E. Korpela, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential in Action Against Remote
Manufacturer or Distributor for Defects in Goods Not Causing Injury to Person or to Other Property,
16 A.L.R.3d 683, § 5 (1967).
123. McNeal v. Blue Bird Corp., No. 308763, 2014 Mich. App. LEXIS 1082, at *12 (June 12,
2014) (quoting Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Paty’s, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 853, 856 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)).
124. See Paulson, 107 Wis. 2d at 518.
125. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80–81 (N.J. 1960).
126. WIS. STAT. § 402.314(2)(c) (2015–2016).
127. See id. § 402.314(2).
128. Id. § 402.314(1).
129. Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 81 (quoting Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash.
1932)).
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an express warranty can be the basis for creating a contractual relationship, the
implied warranty of merchantability should be accorded the same treatment.130
The same policy reasons that caused courts to ignore the vertical privity
requirement when they adopted strict liability applies equally to the implied
warranty of merchantability. The doctrine of strict liability in tort evolved from
contract warranty theories.131 The evolution of strict liability in tort is
understood as a way of extending express and implied warranties to protect the
remote purchaser.132 Some of the reasons why strict liability was imposed upon
manufacturers of products includes the fact that the manufacturer created the
risk by putting its product in commerce; the manufacturer can control its risk
by manufacturing safer products; and the manufacturer can more equitably
distribute the damages its defective products caused through price
adjustments.133 Those same principles apply to the implied warranty of
merchantability.134 The manufacturer should not be permitted to place a
product in commerce that is not fit for its ordinary purpose. The manufacturer
has complete control over the product it places in commerce, and lifting the
privity requirement encourages the manufacturer to build quality into its
products.135 Also, some courts believe that “[e]conomic loss can certainly be
as disastrous as physical injury.”136 Finally, the manufacturer is in the best
position to equitably distribute the economic loss caused by its defective
product through price adjustments.137 The risk of the lemon is passed along to
all buyers, as opposed to the individual, unlucky buyer.138
In the modern marketplace, the retail seller is simply the economic conduit
for the manufacturer’s product, and as such, the implied warranty of
merchantability should pass through to the remote buyer. Most products sold
in the marketplace are sold through a conduit such as a wholesaler or retailer,

130. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (La.
1972).
131. See Northridge Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 162 Wis. 2d 918, 933, 471 N.W.2d 179, 184–85
(1991).
132. Id. at 933–34 (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 95, 95A (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
133. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 451, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967).
134. State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984) (quoting Morrow v. New
Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 289 (Alaska 1976)).
135. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc. v. Goodin, 822 N.E.2d 947, 959 (Ind. 2005).
136. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Tex. 1977).
137. Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 550, 453 N.W.2d 872, 876 (1990) (quoting Dippel, 37
Wis. 2d at 450–51).
138. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., 822 N.E.2d at 959.
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and not directly from the manufacturer.139 The reason for this is simple. It’s
cheaper for the manufacturer to sell its products through a conduit rather than
incurring the costs of direct sales themselves.140 In light of the fact that
manufacturers currently do, and likely will continue to, sell their products
through conduits, the law should reflect the commercial realities of those
transactions. The intermediaries between the ultimate buyer and the remote
manufacturer are simply the economic conduits of the manufacturer.141
Finally, the manufacturer can control its exposure to economic loss
damages as a result of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
through the effective use of disclaimers and limitation of remedies. First of all,
the measure of damages for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability
“is the difference . . . between the value of the goods [as] accepted and the
value” of the goods as warranted.142 Also, consequential damages include those
losses that the seller “at the time of contracting had reason to know and [that]
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise.”143 In other words,
the potential contract damages are not open ended as is often the case with tort
damages. Further, the manufacturer can manage these contract damages by
limiting the remedy for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.144
Or, the manufacturer can simply eliminate any contract damages by disclaiming
the implied warranty of merchantability.145 Unquestionably, a manufacturer
can protect itself from unpredictable and excessive damage claims by limiting
remedies and issuing disclaimers.146
F. Analysis
The requirement of vertical privity provides that in order for a buyer to sue
a remote manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability,
they must be parties to the same contract.147 That rarely happens, and frankly

139. Lars Perner, Distribution: Wholesaling and Retailing of Food Products,
http://www.consumerpsychologist.com/food_Distribution.html [https://perma.cc/H85E-QZ3M] (last
visited Nov. 7, 2017).
140. Id.
141. State v. Mitchell Const. Co., 699 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Idaho 1984); see also Morrow v. Caloric
Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 53 (Mo. 1963).
142. WIS. STAT. § 402.714(2) (2015–2016).
143. Id. § 402.715(2)(a).
144. Id. § 402.719(1)(a).
145. Id. § 402.316(2).
146. Peterson v. N. Am. Plant Breeders, 354 N.W.2d 625, 632 (Neb. 1984).
147. Prinsen v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 145, 215 N.W. 905, 906 (1927) (citing Peterson v. Gales,
191 Wis. 137, 142–43, 210 N.W. 407, 409 (1926)).
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should no longer be required. The requirement of vertical privity was created
when manufacturing was in its infant stage.148 Its creation was designed to
protect manufacturers from costly litigation until they had a sufficient
opportunity to establish themselves financially.149 That time period has long
passed. In today’s society, manufacturers are clearly financially able to defend
themselves against litigation. Therefore, the current focus should shift from
protecting the manufacturer to protecting the buyer.
The implied warranty of merchantability requires that any product sold by
a manufacturer must be fit for its ordinary purpose.150 Common sense suggests
that every product made by a manufacturer should meet that minimum standard.
No product should be sold in the marketplace that is not fit for its ordinary
purpose. The importance of this common-sense standard is underscored by the
fact that it is mandated by law and imposed on every manufacturer.151 The
implied warranty of merchantability is a statutory warranty.152 Its importance
is further underscored by the fact that it can only be disclaimed by using the
word “merchantability” and the disclaimer must be conspicuous.153 Given the
obvious importance and significance of the implied warranty of
merchantability, it does not seem just to permit a manufacturer to hide behind
various defenses when its product proves un-merchantable. For example, a
buyer can be denied remedy against the manufacturer because of the dealer’s
insolvency, lack of jurisdiction over the manufacturer, dealer disclaimers in the
contract of sale, or statute of limitation issues.154 If the implied warranty of
merchantability is as important as the UCC suggests, these defenses should not
be available. They simply perpetuate an injustice.
Further, manufacturers do not need the various defenses noted above.
Manufacturers have ample opportunity to protect themselves when their
product is sold. The UCC permits manufacturers to disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability155 and also to limit the remedy of an unsatisfied
buyer.156 Is it not more honest to require a manufacturer to conspicuously

148. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 155 N.W.2d 55, 58 (1967).
149. Id.
150. WIS. STAT. § 402.314(2)(c).
151. Id. § 402.314(1).
152. Id.
153. Id. § 402.316(2).
154. Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 83 (Tex. 1977) (quoting Prosser,
supra note 51, at 1124).
155. WIS. STAT. § 402.316(2).
156. Id. § 402.719.
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disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability in the contract of sale, rather
than permit the manufacturer to hide behind the various defenses noted above?
Also, it’s a simple task for manufacturers to disclaim the implied warranty
of merchantability and limit a buyer’s remedies. Virtually every product sold
by a manufacturer contains some type of an express warranty.157 As such, the
manufacturer can simply place any disclaimers and limitation of remedies in
with its express warranty. The courts have already approved such an
approach.158 Actual knowledge is not required by the buyer or dealer, but
simply that the disclaimer and limitation of remedy be “reasonably noticeable”
when the sale occurs.159
As noted, manufacturers simply need to make sure that their disclaimer or
limitation of remedy is reasonably noticeable to the buyer.160 One of the
primary ways to make the manufacturer’s disclaimer or limitation of remedy
reasonably noticeable is to place that burden on the manufacturer’s dealer or
retailer. One of the primary arguments espoused by the courts in support of
keeping the vertical privity requirement is that the requirement of vertical
privity encourages a buyer to be more careful when selecting its seller.161 In
fact, the converse should be true. The manufacturer should be more careful
when it chooses its seller to be sure that its seller will make the manufacturer’s
disclaimer or limitation of remedy reasonably noticeable.
Removing the vertical privity requirement as an impediment to a suit
against a remote manufacturer is an outgrowth of the economic loss doctrine.
The economic loss doctrine provides that a claim solely for economic loss can
only be brought as a contract action.162 A breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability is clearly a claim for economic loss and, therefore, must be
brought as a contract action.163 Since the buyer is forced by law to pursue only
a contract action, the law should provide every opportunity for the aggrieved
buyer to secure a full recovery in that contract action. Thus, extending the
157. V. Padmanabhan, Marketing and Warranty, in PRODUCT WARRANTY HANDBOOK 393, 402
(Wallace R. Blischke & D.N. Prabhakar Murthy eds., 1996) (citing E. PATRICK
MCGUIRE, INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT WARRANTIES: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 1 (1980)) (“Although
virtually all producers of industrial goods offer some sort of warranty, there is substantial variation in
the kind of protection provided, the length of the warranties, and in the method of administration.”).
158. E.g., R & L Grain Co. v. Chi. E. Corp., 531 F. Supp. 201, 207 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
159. Id. at 208–09.
160. See id. at 209.
161. Flory v. Silvercrest Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 388–89 (Ariz. 1981) (quoting State ex rel.
W. Seed Prod. Corp. v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 215, 217–18 (Or. 1968)).
162. Ralph C. Anzivino, The False Dilemma of the Economic Loss Doctrine, 93 MARQ. L. REV.
1121, 1121 (2010).
163. Anzivino, supra note 18, at 1083.
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implied warranty of merchantability to the remote manufacturer is entirely
consistent with and a fair outgrowth of the economic loss doctrine.
Interestingly, both the majority and minority of state courts cite the
legislature’s adoption of the UCC section 2-318 (Third Party Beneficiaries of
Warranties Express or Implied) as support for their particular rule when it
comes to extending the implied warranty to the remote manufacturer.164 Of
course, the legislature’s adoption of section 2-318 can’t support both positions.
It’s more likely the adoption doesn’t support either position, which is exactly
what the official comments to the UCC state.165 Wisconsin has adopted
alternative A to section 2-318.166 It is the narrowest of the three alternatives
available under the UCC.167 The argument that the adoption of section 2-318
precludes any further extension of warranties was made and rejected by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court.168 In Dippel v. Sciano, it was “argue[d] that the
legislature by enacting sec. 402.318, . . . acted in the field and [therefore,] has
specifically limited the seller’s liability for breach of implied warranty to the
buyer’s family and guests.”169 The court responded by quoting the UCC section
2-318, comment 3, which provides that “the section is neutral and is not
intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s
warranties, given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the
distributive chain.”170 Based on the comment, the court rejected the preclusion
argument.171 In other words, the adoption of Wisconsin Statutes section
402.318 and its language is not a bar to the extension of the implied warranty
of merchantability to a remote manufacturer.
Finally, it should be noted that extending the implied warranty of
merchantability to the remote manufacturer does not necessarily mean that the
aggrieved buyer will win its case. Rather, the buyer must still carry its burden
of proof, and if it fails to do so, the buyer will lose.172

164. See Mack Trucks of Ark., Inc. v. Jet Asphalt & Rock Co., 437 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Ark. 1969)
(demonstrating the majority opinion); see also Tex Enters., Inc. v. Brockway Standard, Inc., 66 P.3d
625, 628 (Wash. 2003) (demonstrating the minority opinion).
165. U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
166. Compare WIS. STAT. § 402.318 (2015–2016), with U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST.
& UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1999).
167. WIS. STAT. § 402.318.
168. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 458, 155 N.W.2d 55, 62 (1967) (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318
cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)).
169. Id. at 458 (citing U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)).
170. Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962)).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Clark v. DeLaval Separator Corp., 639 F.2d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The requirement that an aggrieved buyer may not sue a remote
manufacturer for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability was created
at a time when it was thought necessary to protect the fragile manufacturing
industry in this country. Those days have long passed. Nowadays,
manufacturers are well able to defend themselves, both financially and through
disclaimers or limitation of remedies, when their products are sold. At this
point in time, the focus should shift from protecting the manufacturers to
protecting the aggrieved buyer.
The implied warranty of merchantability is the most basic warranty that
every manufactured product must meet. It is simply common sense that no
manufacturer should make and sell a product that is not fit for its ordinary
purpose. This obligation is so essential that the Uniform Commercial Code
mandates it by requiring every manufacturer to give the warranty as a matter of
law. To be fair, however, the Uniform Commercial Code does permit a
manufacturer to limit its exposure by allowing the manufacturer to disclaim the
implied warranty or limit the buyer’s remedy. The balance provided by the
UCC seems to be the correct one in that every buyer receives the implied
warranty unless the manufacturer has reasonably disclaimed it. That seems a
fair bargain to both sides. Inserting the requirement of vertical privity into the
balance unfortunately has created technical defenses that has left buyers
without a remedy. The net effect of these defenses is that the manufacturer can
avoid its responsibility without having to disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability. On balance, the requirement of vertical privity is unnecessary,
unfair to any buyer, and should not be tolerated by the law.

